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Special Issue Submission Under Revised Rule 277: Scott v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Allen J. Scott, a railroad employee, sustained injuries after a train on
which he was riding derailed near Plantersville, Texas. The derailment
occurred not long after the area had received an unusually heavy rain-
storm. Scott brought suit in state district court to recover for his injuries,
basing his cause of action on the Federal Employer's Liability Act.' The
trial court submitted the case to the jury on a single, broad negligence
issue.2 The jury found in favor of the plaintiff; the defendant railroad
appealed on the theory that the negligence issue should have been limited
to the acts or omissions pleaded by the plaintiff and about which there was
some proof to support the submission of an issue. The court of civil ap-
peals reversed, stating that the general negligence issue as it was framed,
having no limiting instructions, allowed the jury to consider acts and omis-
sions alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint but upon which no evidence
was offered at trial.' The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error.
Held, affirmed: Although the revision of rule 277 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure allows the court to submit broad issues in negligence
cases, an issue is overly broad if it allows the jury to consider matters that
were not both pleaded and proved. Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 126 (Jan. 4, 1978).
I. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
For sixty years Texas procedure required that special issues be submit-
ted "separately and distinctly."4 This language, however, was interpreted
1. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
2. Special Issue Number One read, "Do you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that on the occasion in question the railroad was negligent?"
3. Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 551 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977). Because the amount of rainfall during the storm was unusual for
that area, the court of civil appeals also required the submission of an inferential rebuttal
issue inquiring whether the accident was due solely to an act of God, despite the explicit
prohibition of such issues in the revised rule. See note 14 infra. Predictably, the supreme
court reversed this part of the holding. They did, however, say that the defendant railroad
was entitled to an instruction relating to acts of God. Although submission of the matter as
a separate inferential rebuttal issue was clearly prohibited, the court required submission of
the same defensive aspect in an instruction.
4. The Texas Legislature established special issue practice in the state in 1913 by pro-
viding, in part, that "[iun all jury cases, the court, upon request of either party, shall submit
the cause upon special issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence in the case." 1913
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 59, § 1, at 113. Until rule 277 was revised in 1973, separate and distinct
submission of all controlling elements was required.
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differently in negligence cases than in non-negligence cases.' In negli-
gence cases application of the rule resulted in submission of narrower,
more specific issues, whereas non-negligence cases were allowed to be sub-
mitted on broader, more general issues.6
The landmark decision regarding the degree of specificity required in a
negligence case was Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.' This was a wrongful death
action brought against the hotel for fatal injuries sustained by Alexander
Fox while he was trying to operate a defective elevator. Although many
specific acts of contributory negligence were pleaded, the trial court sub-
mitted only one issue to the jury regarding that defense: whether Fox was
guilty of contributory negligence in his conduct in, around, or about the
elevator or the elevator shaft prior to or at the time he was injured.' The
jury found for the plaintiff on that issue and defendant hotel appealed.
The Amarillo court of civil appeals reversed the trial court and the
Supreme Court of Texas affirmed that reversal, ruling that the defendant
was entitled to a separate and distinct submission of each issue involved.9
The requirement of separate and distinct submission of each controlling
issue created confusion in the courts and within the profession.'" Compli-
cating this situation was the distinction between negligence cases and those
tried on a non-negligence theory. The Supreme Court of Texas, in Roosth
& Genecov Production Co. v. While, acknowledged that the distinction was
illogical but nonetheless upheld the rule."
5. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. v. White, 152 Tex. 619, 262 S.W.2d 99 (1953).
6. 5 W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 122.03(5) (1977); G. HODGES, SPE-
CIAL ISSUES SUBMISSION IN TEXAS § 36 (1959). Exceptions to the rule governing negligence
cases were those cases tried on theories of res ipsa loquitur or failure to exercise proper
control. In such cases, a broader submission of the jury question was allowed. An example
may serve to clarify the distinction between negligence and non-negligence cases. In City of
Houston v. Lurie, 148 Tex. 391, 224 S.W.2d 871 (1949), a non-negligence case, the supreme
court approved submission of an issue which asked if defendant's house constituted a seri-
ous fire hazard, instead of requiring several issues asking about specific conditions in the
house. On the other hand, the court disapproved a submission in a negligence case which
asked if an oil derrick, as it stood, was defective and also disapproved a corollary issue,
conditioned on an affirmative answer to the first one, asking whether the derrick was defec-
tive to the extent that it was inherently dangerous. Roosth & Genecov Prod. Co. White,
152 Tex. 619, 622, 262 S.W.2d 99, 103.(1953).
7. Ill Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
8. Id. at 476, 240 S.W. at 522.
9. Id. at 469, 240 S.W. at 519.
10. Two cases decided by the supreme court on the same day illustrate the problem. In
Barclay v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel Co., 387 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1965), the court approved a
submission which inquired generally as to failure to exercise proper control of a motor vehi-
cle. The plaintiffs request for additional issues on failure to apply brakes and on an alleged
left turn was denied by the trial court. In affirming, the supreme court concluded that the
issue of proper control encompassed the two refused issues, and that refusal was therefore
not error. Id. at 646. In Whitfill v. Hunt, 387 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1965), however, the
supreme court considered a similar set of facts and held that issues which asked if plaintiff
failed to keep a proper lookout, or if he failed to yield, did not encompass and render unnec-
essary issues which asked if plaintiff had failed to apply his brakes or if he had failed to
sound his horn.
11. 152 Tex. at 628, 262 S.W.2d at 104. The court stated that a change in the rule would
merely result in confusion. Id. at 627, 262 S.W.2d at 103.
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With this confused situation in mind,' 2 and because of political pres-
sure,' 3 the drafters of the 1973 revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure wrote rule 277 to eliminate the separate and distinct requirement.' 4
Issues in negligence cases were no longer subject to attack on the grounds
that they combined several controlling elements or that they were too gen-
eral.'5 The Texas Supreme Court addressed the new rule for the first time
in Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell.16  Mobil Chemical was tried on a res ipsa
loquitur theory, and thus came under an exception to the Fox v. Dallas
Hotel rule.' 7 The court discussed the new rule, stating:
12. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 128; Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special
Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
13. The 1971 legislature had passed a bill abolishing special issue practice and institut-
ing a general verdict system. Governor Smith vetoed the measure. The 1973 legislature
postponed consideration of a similar bill because the supreme court was at that time in the
process of amending rule 277. See generally Pope, The Present Status of the Charge in Civil
Cases, in Southern Methodist University CLE series (June 24, 1977).
14. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 now reads in part:
It shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit separate questions
with respect to each element of a case or to submit issues broadly. It shall not
be objectionable that a question is general or includes a combination of ele-
ments or issues. Inferential rebuttal issues shall not be submitted . . . . The
court may submit special issues in a negligence case in a manner that allows a
listing of the claimed acts or omissions of any party to an accident, event, or
occurrence that are raised by the pleadings and the evidence with appropriate
spaces for answers as to each act or omission which is listed. The court may
submit a single question, which may be conditioned upon an answer that an
act or omission occurred, inquiring whether a party was negligent, with a list-
ing of the several acts or omissions corresponding to those listed in the preced-
ing question and with appropriate spaces for each answer. Conditioned upon
an affirmative finding of negligence as to one or more acts or omissions, a
further question may inquire whether the corresponding specific acts or omis-
sions (listing them) inquired about in the preceding questions were proximate
causes of the accident, event, or occurrence that is the basis of the suit. Simi-
lar forms of questions may be used in other cases.
15. Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974); Shasteen v. Mid-Continent
Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.) (approving
general submission of fraud). See generally Pope, A New Start on the Special Verdict, 37
TEX. B.J. 335 (1974); Pope & Lowerre, supra note 12; Morris, Special Issues and Instruc-
tions-Current Problems, in I State Bar of Texas Advanced Civil Trial Course (Jan. 1978);
Scott, ProceduralAspects of Special Issue Submission in Texas, in 2 State Bar of Texas Ad-
vanced Civil Trial Course (Jan. 1978).
16. 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974). The supreme court suggested that the following issue
would be satisfactory:
1. Did Edward Bell sustain an injury while on the premises of the defendant
on or about April 5, 1966?
2. Did J.A. Hurley sustain an injury while on the premises of the defendant
on or about April 5, 1966?
3. Was the escape of the acetic acid on the occasion inquestion due to the
negligence of defendant, its agents, servants, or employees?
4. Was such negligence, if you have so found, a proximate cause of the inju-
ries, if any, to Edward Bell?
5. Was such negligence, if you have so found, a proximate cause of the inju-
ries, if any, to J.A. Hurley?
6. Damages as to Edward Bell?
7. Damages as to J.A. Hurley?
Id. at 256-57.
17. See note 6 supra.
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The rule means that in an ordinary negligence case, where several
specific acts of negligence are alleged and evidence as to each is intro-
duced, the submission of a broad issue inquiring generally whether
the defendant was negligent is not error and is not subject to the ob-
jection that the single issue inquires about several elements or issues.18
This statement formed the basis for the holding in Members Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Muckelroy, 9 the leading civil appeals case on the revised rule.
The court relied heavily on Mobil Chemical, overlooking the fact that Mo-
bil Chemical was a res ipsa loquitur case and that the supreme court's ref-
erence to the revised rule was a mere dictum."0 In approving a check-off
form for issue submission in Muckelroy, the court of civil appeals also
approved the broad submission of the negligence question.21 This sub-
mission was, however, accompanied by a limiting instruction that the court
reasoned was sufficient to overcome an objection that the jury may have
improperly considered testimony not raised by the pleadings or supported
by the evidence.
22
The general trend of civil appeals decisions regarding the proper sub-
mission of special issues in negligence cases follows Muckelroy in allowing
broader, more general issues. In Gaber Co. v. Rawson2 3 the court of civil
appeals approved an issue which inquired generally into a failure to exer-
cise due care. This is a marked change from the old rule which would
have required a separate and distinct submission of each act or omission
18. 517 S.W.2d at 255.
19. 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
Blanton, The Nature ofDamages in Personal Injury Actions as Viewed by a TrialJudge, 18 S.
TEX. L.J. 157, 163 (1977).
20. Because Mobil Chemical was decided before the new rule became effective and
because of the peculiar nature of the liability question in a res ipsa loquitur case, the
supreme court's statement on the revised rule must be taken within its context. In
Muckelroy the Houston court took the Mobil Chemical statement out of its unique context
and applied it in the broadest sense. Muckelroy declared that Mobil Chemical had said that
broad submissions were acceptable. 523 S.W.2d at 81. It did not, however, address the
meaning of the word "broad." The supreme court refused to grant a writ of error, thereby
lending credence to the interpretation of the court of civil appeals. Subsequent cases deal-
ing with issue submission under the new rule followed Muckelroy and allowed an undefined
"broad submission." Scott was the one exception to this trend and the only case dealing
with the point which the supreme court heard. When the supreme court agreed with the
Beaumont court of civil appeals and began defining what were permissible submissions and
what submissions would be overly broad, many attorneys were caught by surprise. Mobil
Chemical and Muckelroy, both thought of as decisions from which to progress still further,
were limited to their respective facts. In Scott the court dealt with specifics and attempted
to clarify the true meaning of rule 277.
21. The special issue in Muckelroy asked the jury to determine:
"Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence
proximately caused the collision made the basis of this suit?
ANSWER:
(a) The defendant, Verdie Webber.
(b) The plaintiff, Jasper Muckelroy.
(c) Both.
For an excellent criticism of this case, see 5 W. DORSANEO, supra note 6, § 122.121(1)(d).
See generally I STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES (Supp. 1973).
22. 523 S.W.2d at 82.
23. 549 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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that evidenced a lack of reasonable care.24 Similarly, a court has permit-
ted the submission of a general issue inquiring as to whether or not a traf-
fic signal was in a malfunctioning condition, instead of asking about each
alleged malfunction.25 Perhaps the most liberal submission allowed
under the new rule occurred in a malpractice suit in which the jury was
simply asked whether or not a doctor was "negligent in his diagnosis
and/or medical care and treatment" of his patient.26
Not all courts of civil appeals agree with Muckelroy, however. While
accepting an issue modeled on Muckelroy, the El Paso court has stated its
preference for individual submission of each separate act or omission in
regard to each party, despite the dominant trend towards broader, more
comprehensive issues.27
II. SCOTT V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY
In Scott the Texas Supreme Court dealt directly with the revised rule
for the first time. Justice Daniel, writing for the majority, affirmed the
court of civil appeals, holding that to permit'submission of a broad negli-
gence issue without an accompanying instruction confining the jury's de-
liberations to those acts or omissions which were both raised by the
pleadings and supported by the evidence was reversible error.2"
The court first addressed whether there was some evidence to support
each of the plaintiff's specific allegations of negligence. It found eviden-
tiary support for all of the allegations except for the allegation that the
track, supporting bed, and ties were faulty in construction, materials, or
maintenance. The special issue, which asked only if the defendant rail-
road was negligent, was, therefore, overly broad in that it allowed the jury
to consider a factual theory which was raised by the pleadings but not
supported by the evidence.29
The court then dealt with plaintiff's argument that the above ruling was
in conflict with the holdings in Muckelroy and Mobil Chemical. It distin-
guished Muckelroy on the ground that in that case there apparently was
some evidence in support of all of the alleged acts of negligence, and that
the procedural question involved there concerned the alleged failure of the
issue to limit the jury's consideration to the pleadings.3" That situation is
clearly different from Scott in which the procedural question involved the
failure of the issue to limit the jury's consideration to the proof.
24. Id. at 23.
25. State v. Norris, 550 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref d
n.r.e.).
26. Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ dism'd
by agr.).
27. Herrera v. Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 126, 128 (1978); see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 407, 420 (1978).




The court distinguished Mobil Chemical on three bases, the first being
the fact that, as in Muckelroy, there appeared to have been some evidence
in support of all the alleged acts of negligence. Mobil Chemical was fur-
ther distinguishable on the basis that it was tried on a res ipsa loquitur
theory, and as such, would have been an exception to the old Fox v. Dallas
Hotel rule. 3' Finally, and most importantly, the court recognized that in
Scott, unlike Mobil Chemical, there were facts in evidence from which the
jury might have inferred negligence, although those facts were not
pleaded.32
The purpose of special issue practice is to allow for greater judicial con-
trol over jury deliberations.33 The supreme court did not intend to defeat
that purpose when it revised Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277. Instead,
its purpose was to clarify and simplify the process of framing special is-
sues.34 To allow the jury to infer acts of negligence from the evidence
when such acts have not been raised by the pleadings is contrary to the
policy underlying special issue practice.35 In light of this policy, the court
held that failure to limit the broad ultimate fact issue to acts or omissions
raised by both pleadings and proof violated rule 277, and under the facts
in Scott probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. 36
The court also considered whether a proposed limiting instruction
would be sufficient to restrict the jury's consideration. The proposed in-
struction read: "In determining negligence you may consider only those
acts or omissions which are both alleged in the pleadings and supported by
the evidence. 37
The court rejected this proposal because it allows the jury to determine
questions of law which are within the trial court's area of responsibility.
Questions of adequacy of the pleadings and of the legal sufficiency of the
evidence, the court concluded, have no place in the jury room.38
The court suggested three possible ways to achieve the required limita-
tion on what the jury may consider. The practice of listing the acts or
omissions raised by both the pleadings and the evidence in a broad ulti-
mate fact issue was specifically approved,39 as was the practice of incorpo-
rating such a list in a checklist form." In a case in which the listing of
relevant acts or omissions in the issues themselves would be cumbersome,
complicating, or otherwise undesirable, the court suggested that an instruc-
tion be given which would list the acts or omissions to which the jury must
31. See note 6 supra.
32. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 128.
33. 5 W. DORSANEO, supra note 6, § 122.01.
34. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 129. See generally Pope & Lowerre, supra note 12.
35. TEX. R. Crv. P. 279 requires that the court submit the controlling issues made by the
pleadings and the evidence.
36. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 128.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 128-29.
40. Id. at 125.
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limit its consideration.4'
Justice McGee dissented in Scott, stating that he felt that no additional
instruction was necessary and that the broad form of special issue submis-
sion used was permissible under Mobil Chemical and Muckelroy.42 He
feared that the use of instructions would be carried to excess, thus defeat-
ing the intent of revised rule 277 to have a simpler special verdict system.43
Considered in light of the three alternative means of restricting the scope
of the jury's deliberations proposed by the majority, such excesses appear
unlikely.
III. CONCLUSION
In Scott the supreme court interpreted rule 277 to remove the old, nar-
row restrictions of the Fox v. Dallas Hotel rule, and yet to prevent the
submission of an issue which asks merely if there was negligence without
requiring a list of relevant acts or omissions which the jury can consider.
Such an interpretation is in agreement with the underlying purposes of
both special issue practice and the revision of rule 277.
After a brief period in which special issue charges began to look more
and more like general charges, the court seems to be moving away from
the very general type of special issue many thought permissible under rule
277. Instead the court appears to be favoring a more restricted submission
that will focus the jury's attention on only those matters raised by the
pleadings and supported by some evidence. A trial court can no longer
ask merely if the defendant was negligent, but must ask if he was negligent
in respect to certain acts or omissions which must be listed either in the
issue or in a complementary instruction. This method of issue submission
is in accord with the expressed intention behind the revised rule, that of
simplifying the process of submitting the case to the jury while retaining as
much control over the jury as possible.
Maxine Aaronson
41. The court gave the following instruction as an example: "In your determination of
the above question you shall consider only whether the railroad company was negligent in
failing to have necessary culverts or sluices at or near Bridge 46.3 or [here listing any other
acts or omissions raised by the pleadings and the evidence upon the new trial]." Id.
From a practical standpoint there may actually be a great deal of difference between
listing the relevant acts or omissions in an instruction and placing the list in the issue itself.
Presumably, the placing of such a list in the actual issue would have more impact upon the
jury than would the same list when contained in an instruction.
42. Id. at 131.
43. Id.
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